Conversations with Tyler

Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929

Brief

Financial history and banking regulation anchor a debate between Tyler Cowen and Andrew Ross Sorkin over whether 1929 was mainly a leverage-driven speculative mania or whether later panic and policy mistakes mattered more. They then extend that framework to 2008 and to present-day questions around Glass-Steagall, bank consolidation, stablecoins, narrow banking, and retail access to private markets, with both probing how much regulation actually improves safety.

Why it matters

Andrew Ross Sorkin argues the 1929 crash is best understood as a mix of excessive leverage and irrational speculation, while Tyler Cowen pushes the revisionist view that 1929 valuations may have been partly justified by the extraordinary U.S. economic century that followed and that post-crash pessimism may have done as much damage as the bubble itself.

Key details

  • Tyler and Sorkin connect 1929 to 2008 by questioning standard bubble narratives: Cowen suggests 2008 can look less like a pure bubble in hindsight, and the conversation extends to whether Fed decisions, Depression-era policy responses, and Glass-Steagall were built on flawed premises.
  • The episode also turns to current financial structure questions, including U.S. bank consolidation, banking-regulation reform, narrow banking, stablecoins, and whether retail investors should be allowed broader access to private equity and venture capital; it was recorded on October 30, 2025 and published February 4, 2026.
Source evidence

title: Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929
author: Mercatus Center at George Mason University
contenttype: podcast
publication: Conversations with Tyler
published: 2026-02-04T12:30:00+00:00
source
url: https://cowenconvos.libsyn.com/andrew-ross-sorkin-on-market-bubbles-banking-rules-and-the-real-lessons-of-1929

word_count: 264

Andrew Ross Sorkin sees the crash of 1929 as a tale of excessive leverage and irrational speculation, but Tyler wonders: maybe those sky-high 1929 prices were actually justified given America's remarkable century ahead. Maybe the real problem was the "Negative Nellies" who panicked afterward rather than the speculators everyone blamed. For that matter, isn't 2008 looking less and less like a bubble with each passing year? Tyler and Andrew debate whether those 1929 stock prices were justified, what Fed and policy choices might have prevented the Depression, whether Glass-Steagall was built on a flawed premises, what surprised Andrew most about the 1920s beyond the crash itself, how business leaders then would compare to today's CEOs, whether US banks should consolidate, how Andrew would reform US banking regulation, what to make of narrow banking proposals and stablecoins, whether retail investors should get access to private equity and venture capital, why sports gambling and new financial regulations won't make us much safer, how Andrew broke into the New York Times at age 18, how he manages his information diet, what he learned co-creating Billions, what he plans on learning about next, and more. Read a full transcript enhanced with helpful links, or watch the full vi deo on the new dedicated Conversations with Tyler channel. Recorded October 30th, 2025 . Other ways to connect Follow us on X and Instagram Follow Tyler on X Follow Andrew on X Sign up for our newsletter Join our Discord Email us: cowenconvos@mercatus.gmu.edu Learn more about Conversations with Tyler and other Mercatus Center podcasts here . Image Credit: Mike Cohen