222. Understanding Energy and Technology in China - Mar26

title: 222. Understanding Energy and Technology in China - Mar26
author: Redefining Energy
contenttype: podcast
publication: Redefining Energy
published: 2026-03-30T00:50:02+00:00
sourceurl: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/70922947/222_china.mp3

word_count: 7274

1 With Laurent's segal end from London and Gerard Reed from Berlin. 2 This is redefining energy. 3 Today. On redefining energy, we're going to talk about that 4 elephant in the room China. 5 Yeah, the panda, Yeah, the panda. 6 Sorry, you're dead right, panda in the room. 7 But first of all, from my partner. 8 A bl Loco Energy is Europe's premier leaser of ten 9 foot container mobile batteries built in Europe with COTL best 10 LFP cells. A Bloco Energy serves fourteen European countries, including France, 11 Germany and the UK. Our Bloco's batteries can be leased 12 for any duration between six weeks and six years, and 13 they are monitored by the Dutch award winning platform school 14 a Bloco Energy Make your life easier, make your business 15 more flexible. 16 Back to the show, and whatever China does in terms 17 of energy technology investment has so much impact on the 18 rest of the world. But also we have, I believe, 19 a very distorted view of what China does and what 20 China brings. So we thought it was a good idea 21 to bring someone who can talk about that interaction between policy, investment, 22 entrepreneurships and especially with what's happening in the Gulf right now? 23 Is China going to be a winner or loser? What's happening? 24 So jobbed, very very fast field of conversation. Okay, we 25 have decided to bring doctor Michael Maidan. She is the 26 head of the China Energy research at the Oxford Institute 27 for Energy Studies and she knows the China system inside out. 28 So let's bring around the show. 29 Michele. Welcome to the show. 30 Thank you so much, and the excited to talk about 31 the topic today, which is China and really what's going 32 on and energy and maybe it let me just kick 33 off the same one. If I look from the outside, 34 the most astounding thing for me is how China has 35 electrified its society and brought so many people out of 36 poverty over the last twenty years. But maybe talk about 37 that as a starting point. 38 You're right, the sort of transformation of China's energy system 39 in the past twenty years has been phenomenal just in 40 terms of access to energy growth affordability. Though the last 41 five years have been really striking. If you look at 42 some of the charts of penetration rates, of renewable production 43 rates of all the clean technologies they have the sort 44 of es curve Israel, and that has happened really in 45 the space of five years. It's been building up in 46 the system for much longer through industrial policies and innovation, 47 but the impact of that big electrification push with it decarbonization, 48 has really happened over the past five years. That said, right, 49 China has. And it's really fun to talk about the 50 China numbers because it is the biggest of everything. It's 51 got the biggest power system and we've just demand as 52 exceeded ten thousand tarawa hours last year. It's got the 53 biggest renewable deployment in the world, and last year alone 54 it added four hundred and thirty gigawatts of wind and solar. 55 But at the same time it added more coal capacity 56 than India did over the past decade. It's the biggest 57 importer of crude oil, it's the biggest consumer and producer 58 of coal globally. So I think the story beyond that 59 recent electrification is also an optionality and flexibility story, where 60 China has all of the above, and now we're coming 61 to a point of how do you mix and match 62 those energy sources. 63 Looking back at those China mus volume and it's always 64 a bit difficult to know looking back, but you know 65 you've got those plans every five years. Now we are 66 entering in the fifteenth one. How much would you say 67 is stuck down coming to sparty this side and everybody follows, 68 and how much is market led, how much is province led? 69 Or is it very difficult to assess? What are the 70 drivers of that electrification? 71 I think it's electrification and system change more broadly, that 72 comes from clearly a top down vision. There's a guiding principle. 73 There is a very strong central power. Certainly in the 74 past decade, you sort of you can look back and 75 see not as strong centralized power, but an ability to 76 give a sense of direction, to put resources behind that 77 sense of direction. Some of it is subsidies and active support, 78 and some of it then filters down to local governments 79 that give tax cuts or tax brakes and cheaper land. 80 So you do have an enabling policy environment that can 81 trickle down. But within that, once that's created, it's hugely competitive, 82 and you've got the EV's companies and the battery companies 83 that are now making very small margins because they're competing 84 with each other for the market share. So you haven't 85 actually a really interesting dynamic of central government directives that 86 then spurs a lot of competition, and it's not always 87 been efficient and perfect. We've got this image of the 88 monolith in Beijing that is able to direct everything in everyone. 89 The reality is way more complicated and fragmented. You look 90 back at evs, there was so much subsidy fraud and 91 there is so much adjustment and consolidation in a number 92 of sectors. You know, that premise of the central government 93 being able to guide the sector has also led to overcapacity. 94 We've seen it repeatedly in a number of industry and 95 you know, now it's called involution in China and it 96 will lead to a round of consolidation. But it's a 97 really confusing from the outside combination of top down directives 98 and yet a lot of bottom up innovation, competition, creativity, 99 and local government sort of stepping in to protect their 100 needs and their interests, which makes it really confusing. 101 You know, I did a lot of financing in the 102 Chinese solar market like fifteen twenty years ago, and the 103 thing that I was struck by then was was the 104 animal spirits, which is they basically just went out there 105 and said's complete and there was like, I don't know, 106 the probably was one hundred companies at the time, and 107 then if you look at the way the market's consolidated 108 now there really is only a handful of them left. 109 And the other thing that then happened in all of 110 that is these companies became the technology leaders as well. 111 It wasn't that they were just low cost producers. They 112 did everything better quicker than we did in the West. 113 And I suppose when I look at the EV space, 114 I would assume the same is going to happen, or 115 do you see it differently. 116 I mean, there's absolutely a consolidation happening in the EV 117 space and in the battery space. We're going to cut 118 down from over one hundred companies to a handful of leaders. 119 What's also been interesting, sort of in addition to these 120 animal spirits in the clean tech space, which is very 121 very different to traditional oil gas power, these are new companies. 122 These are private entrepreneurs that have come into the space, 123 often from adjacent industries, from batteries or electronics. They've shaken 124 things up in China as well. They have the EV 125 companies or a massive challenge for the incumbents that have 126 been competing with ice makers and Western automakers. So what's 127 really been interesting there is how they've come in from 128 a very different sector. They've innovated, they've shaken up practices. 129 They've also been gradually able to vertically integrate, some more 130 than others. But they've gone from the batteries gradually into 131 the mining as well. Like BID has its own fleet 132 of ships now in order to be able to move 133 the cars around, so there's also sort of ability to 134 weather different storms. I guess on the entire supply chain 135 to your critical mineral costs are taking a hit, then 136 you've got a different segment of the supply chain in 137 which you're making money, and that's really helped them. The 138 bigger and the most powerful ones are the ones that 139 are more vertically integrated, which I think is very different 140 to what we're seeing in the West. Tends to still 141 be quite siloed and quite specialized. 142 I was going to add one. I think it's amazing 143 really is when I look at say something like BID, 144 which is you've gone from sort of a million car 145 production to five million car production, and at the same 146 time you suddenly have eight hundred and fifty thousand employees. 147 It's for me it's the speed at which these companies scale, 148 which is for me astounding because we've never seen anything 149 like this in the West in terms of what they did. 150 And as you said, they're vertically integrated. So BID makes 151 its own batteries, it makes its cars, it makes its 152 power electronics, and it has its own shipping fleet. 153 Right. 154 But obviously, you know, human capital is something that China 155 has lots of. It is BYD that has one hundred 156 and twenty thousand R and D employees. That's kind of 157 scale that we can't really get in the West. And 158 that's again it's an interesting combination of corporate strategies but 159 also government enabling policies. We've written about this quite a bit, 160 where you know, in the West we're focused on its subsidies, 161 it's technology transfers or technology theft, and that's the only 162 thing that the Chinese are good at. If you look 163 at some of the policy framework or sort of what's 164 happening more broadly in industrial policy, there's industrial clusters and manufacturing hubs. 165 That means that you have a huge ecosystem that enables 166 this innovation and enables gill and talent and R and D, 167 and it makes that whole feedback loop between your production 168 and your consumption much faster. If it takes two to 169 three years to come up with a new auto with 170 a new car model in the West, I think it 171 takes nine months in China. And just the fact that 172 you have these ecosystems is really significant, and that's a 173 feedback loop between government and corporate that has really helped 174 some of these innovations and the low carbon technology development. 175 Now, Michael, let's look about the eight hundred pound gorilla. 176 Energy security. It's a fundamental of the China energy pretty see. 177 Can you talk about energy security when it comes to 178 the power sector, and then with address oil and gas, 179 especially considering what's happening in the Gulf right now. 180 If you look at China's power sector, if you look 181 at power supplies in China, they're overwhelmingly domestic. It's mostly coal. 182 Ten percent of Chinese coal is imported, and then it's nuclear, renewables, hydro, 183 a fraction of gas. So really the power system is 184 predominantly self sufficient. Oil and gas. China has four million 185 barrels a day of oil. That's roughly the size of 186 Iraqi production. So it's got massive oil reserves. It's got 187 I think the fourth or fifth largest gas reserves globally, 188 But obviously demand is outstripped that massively, So yes, you 189 can argue an electrification is denting oil demand growth. Gasoline 190 diesel demand in China have already peaked and that's trending downwards. 191 And yet oil imports are not declining. And if you 192 look at future four cots, even in a world where 193 it's energy transition electrification advances rapidly, it's still the biggest 194 crude importer globally. Just because of the size of the system. 195 You're still going to have petrochemical demand and jet fuel 196 demand which sort of offset some of the decline, and 197 transport fuels. But the point is that that vulnerability doesn't 198 go away. What they have again done is giving themselves 199 optionality and a hedge and flexibility in their stockpiling crude. 200 But what we can see is that China's energy security 201 policy seems to be vindicated from these first few weeks 202 of the crisis in the Gulf in terms of oil supplies, 203 the fact that China has diversified its import sources, So yes, 204 it relies on the Golf for fifty percent of its crude. 205 But you can flip it and say it relies on 206 other sources for fifty percent of its crude. It has 207 stocks that it's not releasing just yet, but it does 208 have that as a cushion. And the big electrification program, 209 so moving away from gasoline and diesel to electrification of 210 passenger vehicles and trucks, which have really been gaining momentum 211 over the past year. That serves as a shock absorber. 212 Now that doesn't mean that China is completely insulated from 213 the shocks in the Middle East. Higher prices are impacting 214 Chinese end users and Chinese refiners. There is a physical 215 shortage that is gradually appearing, and there are various indications 216 about exactly how many Chinese tankers are moving through the 217 Strait of Hormuz. But also that as Saudi is finding 218 other export routes, mainly through Yamboo, then the Chinese refiners 219 are able to load some crude. There is still going 220 to be a shortfall, and I think the compounding impact 221 of the lack of availability of oil of products, the 222 precursors to petrochemicals are really important, and the shortages and 223 price increases in gas are going to impact chemicals, for 224 instance in China, But overall, if you compare China to 225 other Asian countries, it is really I don't know if 226 the least ex posed, but it has the most significant 227 buffers and shock absorbers in the system right now. And 228 what about metals, I think metals is something that's going 229 to play out over time with a variety of sort 230 of second and third order impacts from what we're seeing 231 right now. And the other thing we forget when we 232 talk about China's dominance in clean tech, they still need 233 the minerals lithium, cobalt, rare, they have plenty, but manganese, nickel, 234 that's all still important in order to process and to 235 produce clean tech. So it's not like they're completely independent. 236 I hear very clearly what you're saying there. What's for 237 me interesting about China is the fact that what they 238 did is they did see this dependence and said, adism, 239 we need to at least lessen it. And they made 240 this decision maybe fifteen years ago that one we would electrify. 241 But the other thing that they did was they also 242 did it as part of their industrial strategy and geopolitical strategy. 243 Industrial strategy is, hey, let's produce all these components and 244 then geopolitical strategy is you be into export all of 245 these And I think that they've done an amazing job 246 of taking this strategic view of the future. Like again 247 correctness of our own, we might say they were just lucky, 248 but I don't think. I think it was a real 249 plan behind what they've done. 250 Absolutely, there was absolutely an industrial policy and an industrial vision. 251 And if you remember ten fifteen years ago, there was 252 talking China about moving away from industrial capacity, relying more 253 on consumption and services. And they've sort of realized that 254 if you lose your industrial capabilities, you also lose economic 255 competitiveness and a defense industrial base, and they've sort of 256 slowed down that move towards a service oriented industry and 257 sort of a post industrial economy. So they absolutely recognized 258 the importance of industry and industrial capabilities. I think a 259 lot of the clean tech there were different policy strands. 260 So for evs, it was about a combination of of 261 leap frogging ice technologies that they weren't going to be 262 able to compete with energy security that led them to 263 develop the EV sector. Solar started as an export industry, right, 264 it was a few entrepreneurs, as you know, well that 265 came back to China and said, look, they're feeding tariffs 266 in Europe, let's capitalize on that. And it only gradually 267 became a domestic industry. So they started from different perspectives, 268 but again there was that consistent industrial policy and that 269 move throughout the value chain. Because China also has so 270 many resources and natural resources that today it is in 271 an extremely strong position in those supply chains. I'm not 272 sure it's set out to dominate them, but it clearly 273 had a vision that these were things that China could 274 and should develop, with lots of mistakes along the way, 275 but today are pretty successful, a pretty significant position globally. 276 That gives China a huge amount of leverage. 277 Now let's talk a bit about the narrative from the 278 West looking in China, what is real and what is balloons? 279 We need to pop? Because there were very successful books 280 recently saying okay, without Apple transferring so much expertise, they 281 would never been able to produce a smartphone. There is 282 the view which I share that the arrival of Testla 283 and Shanghai somehow has boosted the development of evs. And 284 of course, what is US brilliance versus China execution? Because 285 you go from a football field to a functioning plant 286 in less than a year. I mean, nowhere else in 287 the world is that possible. So my question is what's 288 real and what is fantasized. 289 Everything is real, The question is how do you contextualize 290 it and what do you make of it. Every data 291 point probably that you'll read about China is true, the 292 huge increases in power capacity, but also the fact that 293 coal is still hugely significant, and it's such a vast 294 and big country that you will have innovation that is 295 based on probably pure technology theft, and equally a lot 296 of technology that's based on a lot of hard work, 297 home grown industry and innovation. So all of the above, 298 what's important is the context and the nuance, which we 299 lose very very quickly because the conversation about China, and 300 I would say the energy transition becomes breathless and siloed 301 very very quickly. China's good, China's bad. China can innovate, 302 China can only steal. That's one of our biggest problems. 303 If you look back historically, China's clean tech development has 304 been based around a lot of technology transfers. Initially, there 305 was a lot of innovation that came from the West. 306 Where China has been very very good is at process innovation, 307 at scaling up and again using that massive industrial base 308 and skill base to scale up. I wouldn't say, though, 309 that China cannot innovate today. First of all, that process 310 innovation has been hugely additive and significant when you look 311 at it again, to date, China has been better at 312 sort of that process innovation rather than design intensive technological innovation. 313 So you have less of those disruptive technologies coming from China. 314 It doesn't mean that it's not going to happen. I 315 do think that today in the system where clean tech 316 or low carbon technologies are so developed, that ability for 317 incremental innovation is just huge. We talk about sodium mine batteries, 318 of all, the Chinese are doing that already. Part of 319 it is to reduce dependence on lithium, and part of 320 it is just because there's an ecosystem there. So there 321 was that notion that China can't innovate, and then it's 322 all the innovation and the growth in clean tech is 323 because of subsidies and technology theft. I think that's wrong. 324 It doesn't mean also that China is completely independent and 325 is now going to dominate everything. There are areas where 326 China does need the West and does rely on the West, 327 and obviously synergies and collaboration would be great. 328 What I was going to say, the other advantage that China, 329 I think has is just a fact that it has 330 a big market and the government doesn't just sort of say, 331 go out there and build stories. They go, well, let's 332 create a market for let's create a mark for evs. 333 And so what there is is massive amount of learning. 334 So if I take the case of say electric vehicles, well, 335 actually they started with electric scooters, and they started years ago, 336 and so people were sort of normalized in the around 337 oh yeah electric, yeah, okay, so power cable, so what 338 while we the West have not been normalized in and 339 around it. That's the other big advantage that they have 340 is that they're just more joined up in the way 341 they go and approach these things. 342 The electric scooters and small evs is not an example 343 of a joined up strategy or of Beijing sort of 344 say having this vision. Electric scooters originally and electric motorcycles 345 were not allowed, and this was something that developed because 346 there were batteries and because they were low cost, and 347 innovation just happened because this was such a huge market. 348 It emerged and it wasn't regulated to begin with, and 349 the government actually tried to crack down on it. But 350 then it became such a lucrative market that it's part 351 of the market. That's the other thing that we miss 352 a little bit with this vision that central government has 353 it all planned and designed, and we don't appreciate just 354 how much organic growth and room for innovation there is 355 in I guess at the margins of the market, but 356 the margins of a market like China that just becomes 357 very quickly transformative because of the numbers. 358 And to follow on your point, I add the privilege 359 to see Stella l the number two of BIDE at conference. 360 My god, what a rock star. She started a carry 361 on parking lots waiting that the clowns is open. It 362 is to supply boots and she would come with her 363 samples of imitated the Sangyo batteries. And I mean, look 364 what Biada has become. You can have all the plans. 365 I mean every country make plans. Two ordered countries in 366 the world to ordered plans, but some deliver because you 367 have a generation of entrepreneurs. Zanget c ATN and so on, 368 which I mean those people are absolutely remarkable, and it's 369 always very puzzling that the Chinese system looks very monolithic 370 and top down, as you say, But some heroes, some 371 crazy entrepreneur has managed to put their energ and reinvest 372 like crazy and developed. Now okay, we talk about Bady, 373 but it's the size now they're reaching is absolutely insane. 374 They mean more car Lastion, th and Ford really for 375 being there fo one hundred plus yours. 376 And I think the demand certainty is something that's really 377 really important, where again for low carbon technologies, there has 378 been consistency in the demands actually throughout, but in the 379 policy again where we focus on subsidies, there's been subsidies 380 and government support for production of all of this kit 381 but also for demand and then for the infrastructure to 382 go with it. So you've had that consistency of commitment 383 that has been really really significant, and you have had 384 these entrepreneurs that have been able to come in. But equally, 385 that's one side of the energy system, the coal, oil, 386 gas power. These are not private mavericks. These are state 387 owned companies with a massive legacy of a bureaucracy and 388 a responsibility for energy security and you know, operating in 389 a pricing system that is set by the government and 390 is quite hard to navigate and juggle through. So we've 391 got the two sort of images of China that coexist, 392 which again to your question, which I think is a 393 brilliant question. Everything is true and sort of nothing is 394 true unless you can textualize it. 395 One thing that I'm really interested in is the environmental 396 side of things, because it's very tear you go to 397 China to day and you compare Shanghai to ten years ago, 398 that just the air quality is just in a different league. 399 In fact, it's probably better than most Western cities. Is 400 that by accident or was that part of their strategy? 401 Air quality was a massive driver of change, and if 402 you remember twenty twelve to thirteen, just about the time 403 of a leadership transition, there was heavy pollution in China. 404 If you remember the headlines of Airmageddon, it was impossible 405 to be engaging. It was stifling, and there was a 406 lot of analysis in China as well at the time 407 about the economic costs of deteriorating local air quality, and 408 for many, many years actually efforts to improve air quality 409 where the drivers have changed so evs as well were 410 part of that. There are no sort of known climate 411 deniers in the Chinese leadership, so it's not the climate 412 is a contested issue, the need to improve climate, but again, 413 historically it's been about local air quality that's really been 414 a driver. What maybe a difference with the West, at 415 least the West ten years ago, was that it was 416 one enabling factor for change in the energy system. And 417 so the need to improve air quality alongside the industrial competitiveness, 418 alongside a positive position in climate diplomacy. Most of the time, 419 all of that worked together in order to enable this 420 shift in China's energy system, but climate alone was never 421 a driver. And I think climate and the need to 422 reduce carbon emissions, which right China still has a target, 423 albeit quite nebulous, to peak emissions before twenty thirty and 424 reaching at zero by twenty sixty. That will slow down 425 if it's seen as interfering with economic growth or with 426 industrial competitiveness. The good thing is that it goes hand 427 in hand with economic growth and industrial competitiveness right now. 428 But it's more about air quality than it is about 429 carbon emissions. 430 Michelle, to wrap this great conversation last question with what's 431 happening in the Gulf, and you've said that it's a 432 vindication of china energy strategy, going local, going tech, going green, 433 building reserves. What do you think that the impact of 434 events now will have on the declination of. 435 The few plant There's a lot of continuity. If we 436 assume that there is vindication that these things are working, 437 there's going to be more continuity than anything else. And 438 are sort of doubling down on these principles of encouraged 439 domestic supplies, including in minerals stockpiling. If they draw down 440 or when they draw down on reserves, they're going to 441 have to replenish them. And the fifteen to five year 442 plan does mention oil stock specifically, so that's going to 443 continue once prices calm down. And this kind of focus 444 on technology, but its technology is sort of its renewables 445 and coal. So the issue is that China has its 446 own domestic resources. Renewables are great, but coal is really 447 a significant source of energy security, and we might actually 448 see more coal to chemicals. We were seeing this sort 449 of peak in coal demand that could actually be temporarily 450 reversed because gas, especially with Raslafan, with Katari production out 451 now for potentially a couple of years that will undermine 452 the role of gas in the energy transition and really 453 move the story to renewables and coal and clean tech. 454 I guess the other interesting question is what happens to 455 Chinese exports of clean tech. There's a lot of talk about, well, 456 this only accelerates the move to renewables, but also in China, 457 and we talked about this, we're seeing a slowing in 458 renewable adoption in electric vehicles because of domestic issues, because 459 of price reforms and involution. All of the shock right 460 now is also going to increase pressure on prices and 461 on margins of all the clean tech producers in China, 462 and I think governments around the world. While energy security 463 sort of does increasingly look as though it runs through renewables, 464 we'll have to see inflationary pressure, We'll have to see 465 budgets and appetite to be dependent on China. I mean, 466 I think there's a lot of talk about, you know, 467 China winds or the kind of winners and losers. Way 468 too early to talk about winners and losers. And you know, 469 there are certain areas where there are clear advantages, but 470 they're also huge dissident advantages. The point is that China's 471 electrification and decarbonization will continue this focus on technologies of sufficiency, 472 but there are lots of open questions, especially about the 473 balance of power between the US and China and how 474 that impacts perceptions of China's energy security. 475 Well, I just want to thank you for a brilliant conversation. 476 Really that was very enlightening. Yeah, very And of course 477 we only have thirty minutes, and I'm sure we could 478 speak for hours. But what I will remember, and because 479 you're the expert, you speak Chinese, you read their documents, 480 you go there, is that it's complex and simple. Ideas 481 are just political acts, and you need to put yourself 482 through their eyes and their perspective. So, Michael, thank you 483 very much for coming on the show. 484 Thank you both so much for having me job. 485 I love those conversation, and especially I realized that I 486 know very little about China. 487 I think most of us know very little about China. 488 But that's why we bring experts like her on. I 489 call it the big elephant in the room. What You're right, 490 it's the panda in the room. And it's incredible what 491 they've done in the last fifteen years. If I think 492 of in the areas that we're active, which is the 493 renewables area. Really, you think fifteen years ago there was 494 no major Chinese company that could brand name of right, 495 and then suddenly you've got COTL batteries, number one in 496 the world byde number one electric car manufactor in the world. 497 In the solar space, you've got long Jinko. You can 498 go on and on and on in terms of what 499 they've built up. So it's been incredible, and we just 500 have to keep an eye on what they do going 501 forward because the thing that I like about China is 502 that they really do take this long term approach and 503 they link their economic policy there let's call it the 504 foreign policy, their geopolitical policy, and even their environable ant 505 policy together in these long term plans and they go 506 out and execute. 507 Yeah, for those who really want to dig a bit deeper, 508 especially in the fifteen plan, I will put in the 509 show notes what friends of ours Carbon Brief have put 510 together following the release of the plan, and especially they 511 work with an excellent expert, probably one of the best, 512 alongside Automikael Medan with Lorie mil Verta. So a lot 513 of links. Now, maybe my impression of the fifteen plans 514 a bit wrong, but it's really a continuation of the 515 fourteenth Plan, same leader, same technology. So everything is going 516 to be about more digital, more energy, more vulnerable, more transmission, 517 more that asset us, more of everything, and undimental targets 518 about carbon intensity they have become a bit murky. So yeah, 519 they try to have it both ways. And if there 520 is a crisis, called is always there to fill the gap. 521 What I take out of at Loran as a commitment 522 to being an electro state, that's really what I take 523 out of the right. Yeah, and that's the learning I 524 think for us in the West. Is that the future 525 because that's a technology based future. There's so much innovation 526 going on in that whole area of electrical technologies and 527 and of course obviously AI and digital related to that. 528 That's the future, and that's why we need to jump 529 on the bandwagon, you know. 530 Yeah, because if you look at their relationship with specific fuels, 531 and they were one of the biggest purchases of energy 532 from Qatar, so now it's gone for we don't know 533 how long. If you look at the situation in relation 534 to oil, they still import twelve million baril of oil 535 per day. If you look where those imports come from, 536 where they used to come from Venezuela, so that's a 537 bit at risk. They used to come from Iran, so 538 that's a big question mark. And the rest is Russia, 539 so forty percent of their imports come from sanctioned countries. 540 That's a vulnerability. What they've done in the past two years, 541 which is remarkable, is building their strategic Petroleum Reserve, which 542 went from eighty days two one hundred and thirty days 543 to just to give you an idea, the Strategic Petroleum 544 Reserve of China it's sweet time, is bigger than the 545 US Strategic Petroleum Reserve. They don't truly trust that all 546 fossil fuel complex, and they've created a lot of buffer. 547 I don't know who's going to be a winner and 548 a loser with the current situation in the Gulf, but 549 what is sure is that China has been smart enough 550 to shelter itself from external shocks. 551 I think I like the way you put that there 552 on It's actually not about even winner a loser. It's 553 just making sure that you've protected yourself. It's making sure 554 you're not a loser. I'd say what it's about making 555 sure you're not a loser, and they've definitely done that. 556 Okay job. We thank doctor Michael Maidan. She's a brilliant researcher. 557 She publishes a lot of very good research. We put 558 the link in the show note as well, so make 559 sure that anything you want to ask on China you 560 can call her exactly. 561 Absolutely, thank you very much, my friend. But I'm looking 562 chat forward to chatting again next week. 563 Absolutely looking forward to it. 564 Thank you for listening to Redefining Energy. 565 Don't forget to rate the show and subscribe on Apple Podcast, Spotify, 566 or the platform of your choice.