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Peter Girnus, who has been the California High‑Speed Rail Authority's Director of Strategic Planning for 17 years and authored multiple business plans and methodology updates, lays out a first‑hand account of scope creep, cost escalation, and stalled construction: Proposition 1A (2008) envisioned SF–LA service for $33.5 billion, but the 2026 draft business plan (which Girnus says he authored, page 47) lists a $231 billion cost and a Phase 1 trimmed to Merced–Bakersfield (171 miles). Girnus reports 119 miles of elevated structures exist with no track, a ridership forecast cut from 95 million by 2030 to 36 million by 2060, and fares projected to rise from $55 to $105. He highlights fiscal friction—the $9.95 billion bond costs $647 million/year for 30 years—and governance failures noted by the State Auditor, SNCF’s 2011 exit, lingering eminent‑domain parcels acquired in 2016, a delayed April 29 board vote, and the personal irony that his pension vests in 2034 while he continues to produce plans that always recommend continuing the project.
Peter Girnus, Director of Strategic Planning at the California High‑Speed Rail Authority for 17 years, says he wrote four business plans, oversaw six revisions, and authored eleven methodology updates while the train has not carried passengers; he still keeps a hard hat from the 2015 Fresno groundbreaking in its cellophane as a bookend.
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