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May 12th 2026 For subscribers
Analysing Africa
The best of _The Economist_ ’s Africa coverage
Image: Getty Images
The forgotten people of eastern Congo
John McDermott
Chief Africa correspondent
Earlier this month I took a trip to Goma, the city seized more than a year ago by M23, the Congolese rebels who say they have “liberated” much of the east of Africa’s second-largest country. I will not easily forget being ushered into the inner sanctum of M23’s leadership—after a thorough frisking by men with machineguns—only to be given a slide deck detailing why the Trump administration should strike a deal with the group over its minerals. This exclusive, if surreal, briefing formed the basis of an article that we published over the weekend.
Also unforgettable was the hectic walk around town I took to understand what life was like under M23. I listened back to some of the recordings I made and it is a cacophony: arguments among market traders, hooting taxis, dozens of desperate young men shouting _mzungu_(“white person”, basically) at me. All around the smell of drying fish from the nearby Lake Kivu wafts past, while locals shrug off sights that would startle in most cities—such as the maimed man who had lost a foot and affixed to his stump a giant wooden shoe in the shape of a Nike Air Jordan.
And this is _after_ M23 has been pursuing what I think of as the “Kigalification” of the city, in a nod to the clean and orderly capital of Rwanda, the neighbouring country that supports M23 (according to the UN) and serves as its model for governance. Since taking Goma, M23 has set up a new police force (complete with uniforms that look like that of Rwanda’s) and introduced the forced cleaning of the city every Saturday morning, among other changes. As a result the city is cleaner and there is less petty crime. But much of Goma’s chaos remains.
Yet what I keep thinking about the most is a trip I took with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The NGO had recently resumed its work at a health clinic just outside the city, on the slopes of the Nyiragongo volcano. I was there to see how pent-up demand for free medical care in the area was at last being met. Some got there just in time: in what passes for a ward, a one-month-old with pneumonia fought for her life, wheeze by tiny wheeze, while her mother looked on.
Outside was a long queue of mothers waiting for their malnourished children to be weighed and fed. I chatted with one whose story struck me as symbolic of the way in which ordinary people have been caught up in the conflict between, on one side, the Congolese army, allied _wazalendo_ militias and mercenaries; and on the other, M23 along with its Rwandan patrons and other allied militia.
Kavira, 36, was living in a refugee camp. In the chaos that followed M23’s entry into Goma, her husband’s source of income—a motorbike—was stolen by _wazalendo_. M23 closed her camp and told her to go home to her village, which was impossible as it was in a war zone, 200km away. So here she was with two of her children, both clearly starving, waiting for help. “Nothing good, nothing changed, nothing positive,” she said. “Without this service many more children would die.”
Sadly Kavira may be one of the lucky ones. MSF is still running clinics on both sides of the front line. But many aid groups have pulled out. The UN’s World Food Programme considers much of the region too dangerous to run full-scale operations. Humanitarians in Goma confess that no one really knows the true extent of the disaster.
The good news is that there are diplomatic efforts to stop the conflict. America is still overseeing the “Washington Accords” between Congo and Rwanda. Qatar is leading a separate process between Congo and M23.
The bad news is that neither has led to a permanent ceasefire. Congo is emboldened by what it sees, with some justification, as America taking its side. Rwanda, though stung by sanctions America imposed on its army in March, is still reluctant to stop what it calls its “defensive measures” while it sees threats from across its borders. M23 seems intent on building its quasi-state in the Kivus. So long as they all see more reason to fight than to make peace, ordinary Congolese will remain stuck in the middle.
What else would you like to know about the conflict in eastern Congo? Please write to us with your thoughts at analysingafrica@economist.com.
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Africa this week
A round-up of news from around the continent
▸| Cyril Ramaphosa said he would not resign after his future was thrown into doubt by a verdict of the country’s highest court on May 8th. The Constitutional Court ruled that MPs from the ruling African National Congress (ANC) acted unconstitutionally in 2022 by voting to stop impeachment proceedings against South Africa ’s president. The court asked for a parliamentary committee to revive proceedings by producing a report on the “Phala Phala scandal”. (In 2020 hundreds of thousands of dollars, of unclear origin, were stolen from Phala Phala, Mr Ramaphosa’s game farm, leading to a cloak-and-dagger operation to get the money back.) MPs would then vote on whether to impeach the president. To remove him would require a two-thirds majority. The ANC has around 40% of MPs. But Mr Ramaphosa does not have the same hold on his party as he did in 2022; the ANC will pick his replacement as party leader next year. In a televised address on May 11th he vowed to have the case reviewed by yet another court, ensuring that he will at least delay parliament’s judgment.
▸| Fears of a return to war in Ethiopia ’s Tigray region spiked once again, after hardliners in the ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) ousted the interim state president in defiance of the federal government of Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister. Tadesse Werede, a Tigrayan general put in post by the TPLF just last year—also against the wishes of Mr Abiy—had just recently struck a deal with the Ethiopian government to remain in post for another year. But the TPLF, which fought a catastrophic war against Mr Abiy’s government between 2020 and 2022, accused Mr Tadesse of kowtowing to the prime minister. In taking complete control of the northern region, its leaders now appear to have set themselves up for another armed confrontation with Mr Abiy. They may be further emboldened by reports that America is preparing to lift sanctions on Eritrea, Ethiopia’s neighbour to the north of Tigray. The sanctions were imposed in 2021 during the previous war, in which the Eritrean army took part and committed widespread atrocities. Should conflict return, Eritrea’s leaders are thought to be preparing to intervene again—this time on the side of the TPLF.
▸| Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, and William Ruto, his Kenyan counterpart, agreed some $1bn worth of deals on May 10th, including an $823m joint venture to revamp a port terminal in Mombasa. The agreement, struck ahead of a summit in Nairobi, Kenya ’s capital, is the latest sign that France is widening its engagement on the continent beyond Francophone Africa. Mr Macron also supported calls for Africa to get its own credit-rating agency and invited Mr Ruto to the G7 meeting in France next month. On the sidelines of the summit, some $27bn worth of deals and investments were announced by French and African companies, banks and development-finance institutions. The summit focused on tech, sport and arts over peace and security, reflecting a French desire to recast its relationship with African countries around business rather than military diplomacy.
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