Also: America’s submarine dominance is under threat
May 11th 2026 For subscribers
The War Room
The best of _The Economist_ ’s defence coverage
photo: GETTY IMAGES
Shashank Joshi
Defence editor
Welcome to The War Room.
The idea that you might control a missile by attaching it to a very long wire first cropped up in the 19th century, when it was applied to torpedoes. In the second world war Max Kramer, a German scientist, invented an air-to-air missile which was tethered to its plane by more than three miles of wire, allowing the pilot to manoeuvre it with a joystick. The idea was to avoid radio jamming. Kramer then transposed the idea to land. An anti-tank version, the X-7, was used on the eastern front. In 1973 the Sagger, a Soviet-made wire-guided anti-tank missile, decimated Israeli armour during the Yom Kippur war.
An elderly Egyptian ex-infantryman surveying current wars might be bemused to see that the wire-guided missile is now back in fashion, having been supplanted by heat-seeking and even whizzier means of terminal guidance in recent decades. In Ukraine, the wire-guided first-person-view (FPV) drone—this time controlled by fibre-optic cable rather than copper—has become a pivotal weapon on both sides. That is for the same reason that motivated Kramer’s invention.
A wire-guided missile cannot be jammed, because there is nothing in the air to jam. The result is a mad scramble for fibre-optic cabling, much of which comes from China. A 50km spool once cost $300, notes Dimko Zhluktenko, a Ukrainian soldier. Now it costs $2,500. Fibre-optic cabling also has another advantage over the older methods. It has lower latency, which means less lag and more precise control for a drone operator. Meanwhile, higher bandwidth provides sharper video footage, making it easier to distinguish real vehicles and equipment from decoys.
All the more alarming, then, that Russia appears to have offered the technology to Iran. Last week _The Economist_ got a big scoop. We gained access to a ten-page document prepared by the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, offering to provide Iran with 5,000 fibre-optic drones, long-range Starlink-guided drones and training in how to use them. We don’t know whether Russia ever shared this document with Iran, let alone acted on it. But it suggests the Kremlin was seriously worried by the prospect of an American ground assault. The document includes a map showing how Russian-trained drone operators could attack a slow-moving American landing flotilla.
We have long known that the GRU has had a good working relationship with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It was Iran that provided Russia with designs for the Shahed drones that Russia would later improve, mass-produce and rain down on Ukraine. In 2022 the Biden administration accused Iran of sending trainers to Crimea to help Russia with drone operations. During Operation Epic Fury this year Russia is also thought to have shared intelligence with Iran to help it target American forces in the region.
The lesson for me is that technology and know-how are increasingly flowing between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. In the latest edition of _The Economist_ , we report that China is developing much quieter submarines, for instance, with the help of Russian technology, which has previously been much further ahead in undersea warfare. China, in turn, has kept Russia’s defence industry afloat, with components and parts, during the war with Ukraine. North Korea provided Russia with boots on the ground, but it learned valuable lessons in the process, which would help it in any confrontation with South Korea and America in Asia. Military tech is also flowing outward to proxies. In Lebanon, for example, Hizbullah has surprised Israel by using fibre-optic drones of its own to deadly effect.
Elsewhere, we looked at Russia’s setbacks on the battlefield, how a Ukrainian strike caused a catastrophe on the Black Sea and Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw troops from Germany. We also covered the wobbling ceasefire in Iran, Sino-American competition in AI and why America is massing troops near Taiwan to deter China from any adventurism.
Now to the mailbox. Thanks for all your letters, as always. Frank in Canada asks whether advances in drone warfare would have a major impact on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The answer, in my view, is yes. A Chinese amphibious assault would be extremely vulnerable to large volumes of short-range FPV drones, including those unjammable fibre-optic ones.
America’s Indo-Pacific Command has a concept called “Hellscape”, which envisages pounding any invasion force with these systems, though many would have to be launched from Taiwan itself, rather than farther afield, to be cost-effective. “In each layer,” notes a paper published by CNAS, a think-tank, from 80km away from the landing beach down to 5km away, “the density and intensity of attacks would increase dramatically as Chinese amphibious forces approach Taiwan’s coastline.”
Of course, China would attempt to attack the operators of these drones from the air, much as Israel used mortars to disrupt the aim of Egyptian Sagger operators in 1973. But as the range of these FPVs grows, up to 40km or so, that becomes harder, because the pilots could hide in urban areas and complex terrain. China will be watching closely to see how Ukraine and Russia tackle this problem.
Neil asks about the coup rumours in Moscow. We recently published a guest essay by an unnamed Russian former official describing a change in the mood among his country’s elite. “Now, for the first time since the conflict began,” he wrote, “Russians are starting to imagine a future without [Vladimir Putin].” We also reported on a viral Instagram video by a Russian influencer laying out a series of grievances towards the government. The FSB, Russia’s domestic security service, has become increasingly repressive, most recently taking control of the Russian internet and banning Telegram, a popular social-media platform. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr Putin is on the brink of losing power or that credible challengers wait in the wings, but the cracks in his authority are clear enough.
Peter in Maryland asks whether it is true that Iranian missiles have done heavy damage to American facilities in the Middle East. On May 7th the _Washington Post_ reported that Iranian strikes had damaged or destroyed at least 228 structures or pieces of equipment, including hangars, barracks, depots and valuable radars. CNN noted that at least 16 sites had been struck, covering the “majority” of those in the region. We reported similarly in April, noting damage to American planes, headquarters and other sites.
It is hard to verify all this because American satellite providers have stopped releasing images of such things, in part to avoid aiding Iranian targeting and in part, I would argue, to avoid irritating the Trump administration. It is clear that Iran has enjoyed a lot of success. These strikes were not enough to seriously hinder America’s air war in Iran, because America was flying most of its missions from aircraft-carriers offshore and from more distant bases in Jordan and Israel. But they serve as a warning. China has more advanced missiles and, more importantly, better means of finding targets, forcing America’s air force to fight in a much more dispersed and agile way than it would previously have done.
Finally, thank you to Steve , who offered kind words but expressed reservations about my choice of bright red socks with dark suits during my appearances on Inside Defence and The Insider. In my defence, I am loyal to the brand.
Thank you for reading and see you next week. If you want to email me, you can at thewarroom@economist.com.
Editor’s picks
A selection of must-read articles
Deniable optics
Secret document reveals Russia’s plans to aid Iran
Unjammable drones would be used against American forces, according to proposals seen by The Economist
A bleak view from Moscow
Vladimir Putin is losing his grip on Russia
His every move to preserve power accelerates decay, writes a former senior official in the Russian government
→| Russia is stumbling on the battlefield
→| How a Ukrainian strike on a Russian oil hub caused catastrophe
Taking aim
Despite Donald Trump’s talk, a lasting peace is some way off
Iran is now targeting the UAE
→| Diplomacy or more war? Iran’s leaders are split
Red sky in the morning
America is massing troops near Taiwan to deter troublemaking by China
The timing of annual exercises is set by weather patterns favourable to any possible invasion
→| The Trump-Xi summit will expose a dysfunctional duo
Which navy’s better, down where it’s wetter?
America’s submarine dominance is under threat
Naval mockery of China is turning to alarm
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